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Law and Literature and History
Christine L. Krueger

Thinking historically about law and literature has become a common,
if not obligatory, scholarly pracrice. Yet historicism was largely absent
from the founding of the inrerdiscipline. For the influential "law and
lireramre movement" in particular, New Critical and neo-Aristotelian
paradigms seemed better suited to promoting literature as a humanizing
corrective to legal reasoning that they believed to be rule-bound, unem·
pathetic, and unjust. If putting law and lirerature into conversation
required some deft disciplinary negotiations, that was nothing compared
to the demands of synthesizing both with history. This chapter tells a
story of how this came about: what developments urged historicism on
law and literature, what practical, merhodologica.l and ideological challenges
were overcome, what benefits have accrued from this new multidisciplinary
practice, and what problems it present.~. In effect, this chapter historidzes
how an interdisciplinary practice became a multidisciplinary one.
I begin with the methodological and ideological challenges that compli
cated the development of law, literature, and history as a multidisciplinary
practice, and the imperatives that compelled their synthesis. Two forces
that influenced both law and literature likewise uansformed the discipline
of history: New Historicism and the theorization of historical traumas,
principally in Holocaust studies. New Historicism may be the more obvious
influence, though not an uncomplicated one. The impact that Holocaust
studies has had on transitional justice movements constitutes an equally
potent - and even competing- influence on what history means for law and
literature. Therefore, no account of the multidiscipline can ignore how
justice {law), witness testimony (narrative/literature), and memory (history)
have been interrwined in transitional justice processes, most notably South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The second part of the chapter focuses on examples of scholarship that
fostered mulridisciplinary practices. These texts might engage not only law,
literature, and history, but also political theory, psychoanalytic theory, and
58
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fominist theory. I look first at the significance of the Holocaust in the work
of Richard H. Weisberg, a founder of the law and literature movement.
I suggest that Weisberg' s insistence that law and literature address
the Holocaust necessarily entails historicism. Weisberg's Failure of the
Word (1984), Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (1996), and
1999 essay reflecting on twenty years of law and literature bookend the
other examples I discuss: Barbara Shapiro's "Beyond Reasonable Doubt"
and ''Probabk Cause": Historical Perspectives on the AngW-American Law
ofEvidence (199 1); Alexander Welsh's Strong Representatiom: Narrative
and Circumstantial Evidence in England (1992); and Carole Pateman's
The Sexual Contract (1988). Each historicizes Anglo-American law both
synchronically and diachronically, tracing the evolution of epistemo
logical, social, and polirical issues over the long arc from the early modern
period co moderniry, attentive to particular historical conditions and
drawing evidence from c.anonkal and non-canonical works. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of South Africa's Trurh and Reconciliation
process, drawing on work by various scholars, including Pumla Godobo
Madikizela, a member of the TRC.
My discussion is confined to the English common law tradition, which
is likely to be of greatest significance to readers of this volume. Neverthe
less, as I will conclude, current uses oflaw, literature, and history urge us to
be more international, as well as interdisciplinary.
Disciplinary Barriers
Literary and legal theorists have resisted historicism for reasons unique to
their disciplines and approaches. It might seem obvious that a legal system
based on precedents would be historically self-conscious. Instead, the very
legitimacy of common law depended upon the fiction that each new legal
decision reiterated the truth of prior decisions, albeit in new circumstances.
To admit that law evolved over many decisions and revisions of precedent
would be to demystify the law's transcendent authority and locate legal
power in judges.
Historical jurisprudence first emerged as an influential force in Sir
Henry Maine's Ancient Law (1861), and later in such works as James
Fitzjames Stephen's History ofthe Criminal Law ofEngland (1 883) and The
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I by Frederic William
Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock (1895). While we may think of
historicism as a critical tool to expose entrenched power and denaturalize
oppressive social relations, Victorian positivists, notably John Austin,
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construed historical jurisprudence as reactionary, reasserting tradition
against scientific effons at improving law.
As A. V. Dicey put it in 190 5, "Historical research ... tends to quench

the confident enthusiasm necessary for carrying out even the most well
approved and the most beneficial among democratic innovations."' His
toricism, then, was resisted by both traditional common law thinkers and
positivist legal reformers.
Nevertheless, in the decades preceding the law and literature movement,

historians produced such magisterial works as William S. Holdsworth's
thirteen-volume History of English Law (1903-66).' These may have
become indispensable guides for current law :md literature scholarship,
but they did nor necessarily intervene in legal thinking. And while legal
theorists may have ignored law as history, historians devoted much atten
tion to law and literature in history. For example, laws governing censor
ship attracted the attention of social, political, and literary historians. 3
Copyright law was also addressed as a matter of both legal and literary
history. Well before postmodern theories of the author, Benjamin Kaplan,
in An Unhurried View of Copyright (1967), mooted the idea that concep
tions of authorship arose &om copyright law, 4 But the domain of law
and literature was drawn to exclude a host of robust scholarly relationships
with history.
Perhaps the most telling omission of historical literary criticism &om the

founding of the law and literature movement may be Ian Watt's Rise of
the Novel (1957). 5 Among the preeminent works of literary criticism in the
twentieth century, Watt's study argued that realist fiction succeeded in a

' A. V. Dicey, LHtum on. tM RrlatiM betw«n Law and Pubik Opir,i(}n. ill England (London,
Macmillan, 1962. [19051), P· 461.
~e also Leon Radzinowicz, History ofEngli.<h Crimin11/ I aw and It, Adminimationfrom ,750, ;I vols.
(London: Macmillan, 1948-196S): J. H. Baker, An fn.m,d,,cr£on to English Legal History (Londort:

4

B~tterworth,, i971}; John Beanie, Crime and she (.bum in. Engl,md, 16(11)--I800 (Princeton:
Princemn University Pre-s5. 1986).
[n such studies » Charks Gillet's Burned Books: Neglected O,apurs ,'r, Briti,h Hl.5to,Y and l.i1muun,
(New York: Columbia Vriiver.iity Prc.ss, 193l); F. S. Siebm's Frrrdom oftfu Pm, in England,
1476-1776 (Urb.ana: UniveISity ofl!linois Press, 1952); Dortald ThomaisA L,mg Timr Burning: The
History ~f Literary CemtJrship in. England (New York. Prn,:ger Pu!:>li,hers, 1969) and Leona
Rostenberg's Thr Min,m"ty P,,,,s and the Engltsh Crown: A SruJy in &prm,on., I,<58---,625
(Nieuwkoop: R De Graaf, 1971).
ln Copyright in Hi>toriral Pmprcrive, Lyman Ray Patterson, a lawyer, produced what n::main.1 a
ddiriitive and comprehensive ao:ount of how copyright shaped British literature from the Anr)o
Saxon period to the nineteenth cemury. See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copynghr ,n lfororu:alPmpecttve
(Nashville: Vanderbilt Urtiversiry P,ess, 196!,).
Jan Wau, Thr Rise of the Novd Sn,di~ in. Defoe, Ricl•ardson and Fir/ding (Berkdey: Urtivmiry of
California Press, 1917).
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nevv literary marketplace by addressing readers as jurors, presenting them
with evidence through plot and character, and asking them to render
judgment based on the facts put before them. Though early advocates of
the literary imagination in legal reasoning relied heavily on novels for their
evidence, it was not Watt's historicized account of the genre that underlay
their arguments. Historicism challenged claims for literature as the instan
tiation of stable meanings and rranshistorical values. The significance of
Rise of the Novel for law and literature would eventually be recognized in
Welsh's Strong Representations.
New Criticism, which banished historical scholarship from literary
interpretation, wa.~ favored by early law and literature advocates. Rohen
Weisberg and Guyora Binder locate New Criticism at the head of a line of
practices, from reader-response through structuralism to hermeneutics,
6
which connected law and literature via their formal fcatures. New Criti
cism endowed the aesthetic qualities of literary forms with ethical and
philosophical significance. But it would not smvive challenges from post
modernism and culnual criticism.
New Historicism, which brought postmodern theories to the interpret
ation of history, inspired literary critics to historicize law and literature
topics. Michel Foucault's Madness and Civiliz,uion: A History ofInsanity
in the Age ofReason (1964) and Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison (1975) influenced scholarship on the legal persecution of deviance
and provided rhr.: Panopticon as a compelling metaphor for the rise of a
surveillance state. Early examples of New Historicist literary critics'
engagemenr with legal themes include D. A. Miller's The Novel and the
Police (1986), John B. Bender's Imagining the Penitentiary: Fiction and
the Architecture of the Mind in Eighteenth-Century England (1987), and
Marie~Christine Leps's Apprehending the Criminal' The Production of
Deviance in Nineteenth~Century Discourses (1992). What is more, some
traditional topics in the history of literature and law were revisited under
the auspices of New Historicism. Citing global threats to freedom of
speech in 1984, Annabel Patterson, in Censorship and interpretation: The
Conditions of Writing and Reading in Early Modern England, revisited
early modern censorship in terms of poststructuralist theories of the lyric..,
Mark Rose, in Authors and Owners: The InventUm of Copyright (r993),

6
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Robert Weisberg and Guyora Binder (eds.}, Uurary <:rin'cism, of Law (Princeton: Princeton
University Pres,, 1000), pp. 11 5-15.
Annabd Patterson, Cen,orship artd /r,trrpn:tmion: The Cmdmorn of 1)/riting and Readi.rtg m Early
Modtm (Madi>on: University ofWiswn,iu Press, 1984). pp. 114··l\.
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credited Roland Barthes and Foucault with having "stimulated" reconsid
erations of the legal constructions of authorship. 8
Still, while New Historicism broughr literary critics into the field of law

and literature, it often complicated exchanges with both historians and
lawyers. New Historicism debunked literature as a repository of tran
scendent values. Of what use could this version of literature be to legal
thinkers who looked to literature to provide ethical meaning for legal
decision-making? Conversely, New Historicist literary critics often failed
to do justice to legal history. Viewing history through the lens of Foucault
or Lacan tended to n:veal the same pictures of power and repression, of
disciplinary discourses and the "law of the father," regardless of historical
period or nation. Historians influenced by postmodernism might connect
with llrerary criticism attentive to the material conditions of literary
production. How New Historicist literary critics represented legal history,
however, could strain credulity. And those literary scholars who underM
took to refine New Historicist accounts of legal history encountered
considerable practical and methodological obstacles. Legal documents
were not preserved and organized in such a way as to facilitate historical much less literary- research. Beyond rhe problem of access, interpretation
of legal documents required expertise in case law, trial procedures, and
legal terminology. It would be some time before literary critics succeeded
in bringing to historical legal documents the interpretive tools of literary
analysis.
Of course, these disciplinary negotiations were taking place in larger
historical conrexts, which conjoined law, literature, and history. The HoloM
caust raised devastating anxieties about representation - aesthetic, legal, and
historical. Theodor Adorno's declaration in 195 I that "writing poetry after
Auschwitz is barbaric" crystallized how literature and the aesthetic could
not escape the traumatic history of injustice. The Nuremberg trials had
presented an unprecedented spectacle oflegal procedure as some remedy for
crimes against humanity. They also focused attention on the forensic
probity of testimony and documentary evidence of genocide. Documentary
records of these and other war crimes trials strained conventional historical
explanations and invited psychoanalytic and anthropological interpretM
ations. Hannah Arendc's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality
of Evil (1963) is likely the best-known and most controversial example of
debates over the meaning of justice in war crimes trials.
• Mark Rose, Authon and Ou7tm: Th, lr,vmtion rfCopyright (MassachU5cru: lfarvard Unh·en;ity
Press, 1993), p. 1.
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Holocaust testimony, it was determined, required new disciplinary col
laborations, and projects commenced to collect videotaped interviews of
survivors. These efforts could confer historical, psychological, and ethical
meaning on testimony, operating not from traditional legal conceptions
of evidence, but rather from literary and psychoanalytic principles. For
example, the Video Archive of Holocaust Survivors' Testimonies at Yale
(now the Fortunoff Video Archive) was founded in the early 1980s by
Laurel Fox Vlock, Geoffrey H. Hanman, and Dori Laub, MD. Fox Vlock
was a documentary film maker and reporter. Harunan was a leading expo
nent ofdeconstruction and influential critic ofRomantic poetry and Laub is
a psychiatrist. This multidisciplinary endeavor would preserve a historical
record of Holocaust survivors, informed by an understanding of testimony
that differed fundamentally from its status in legal contexts. In Testimony:
Criser of Wimessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History, Laub and
his coauthor, the literary theorist Shoshana Felman, describe the listeners
(interviewers of survivors) in these terms: "They have to learn ... how to
bond with the narrator in a common struggle to release the testimony
which, in spite of inhibitions on both sides, will allow the telling of the
trauma to proceed and to reach its testimonial resolurion. " 9 This archive,
along with other Holocaust archives around the world, established a para
digm for documenting genocide through first-person narratives. The arch
ives also had a profound effect on how history should be done.
This is evident in the "Historians' Debate" of r986-9 in Germany. The
prospect of Gennany's integration into the West after reunification posed
the question: How would Germany's national identity continue to be
defined by the Holocaust? As Dominick la Capra notes, the debate raised
two broader questions: "whether one could neatly separate between arenas
or spheres in modern life (the professional and the public spheres, for
example) and whether one could define history in purely professional,
objective, third-person terms under the aegis of a structurally differentiated
or even autonomized paradigm of research."'° The historian Ernst Nolte
assened that Germany should no longer be identified with Hitler's "Final
Solution"; significantly, the leading rebuttal came from the political phil
osopher JG.rgen Habermas. rr
9 Shoshana Felman and Dory W!ub (ed.!;,), Tmimony: Crim of Wirnesri"g in Literature, Aychoan,ifyris
and Hirrono (London: Taylor and Francis, 1991), p. .<Vii.
0
'
Dominick WI Capra. Hisrory and Mmwry a.fur At1rchwitz. (fthaca, Cornell Univer5ity Pre~, 1998).
p, 67.
" For a discussion of the "Hisroriaru' Deb~te" in Holoo,ust stud1e,, iee Li Capr.1, Hist11ry and
Mnnory, pp. 49-68.
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Habermas, Adorno, and Arendt were among the philosophers and
political theorists who called on historians to transform their methodologies
to address the Holocaust and historical trauma. La Capra, Hartman, and
Felman were among the literary critics who cxened similar pressure. The
common theme was that not only understanding, but also justice, required
more capacious and multidisciplinary methods of interpretation. Their
claims had implications for !aw, as well. Richard Weisberg's influential
contributions to our interdiscipline reveal how the leg:icy of the Holocaust
engaged law and literature with hiSTory, in a manner distinct from New
Historicism.

Lest Law and Literature Forgeu Richard H. Weisberg and History
In his groundbreaking books The Failure ofthe Word: The Protagonist as
Lawyer in Modern Fiction (1984) and Poethics: And Other Strategies of
Law and Literature (r996), Weisberg had objected to postmodern theor~
ies for their axiomatic indeterminism. Frequently he turned to Holocaust
history to demonstrate that not merely theory but also justice was at
stake. For example, citing Stanley Fish's Is There a Text in This C'4ss?,
Weisberg writes chat "[Fish's] powerful endorsement of the view that
professional norms cannot exist apart from the practices of the commu
nity allegedly bound by those norms must eventually run up against
holocaustic barriers.""· For Weisberg,
rhe lesson of Vichy [France] is that professional commumnes cannot
accept theories denying che objective existence of texrs. They must resist
such theories, yet fight to understand whar is mt'ant by textuality as
something apart from any reader or group of readers, and then substantively
learn to evaluate the motivt's and subjective biases from which all texts
are generated ... [Vichy lawyers'] zeal in interpreting [Nazi) legislation,
unconstrained by traditional (textual) French notiom of egalitarianism and
personal freedom, exemplifies the risks ro professional communities of
theories privileging situation over standards.' J
Weisberg declared in Vichy l,aw and the Holocaust in France (1996) that
"Selective forgetfulness has no place in the post-Holocaust world." 14
Drawing upon archives of historical legal documents, historical scholar
ship, and postmodern theories, Weisberg aimed to debunk the prevailing

" R,char<l H. Weisberg, V,dry !.a.w t1nd the Holormm m Frtzna (London and Nev, York: Routledge,
1996), p. 17).
14
'• Weiskrg, VidQ' Law, p. 17 5.
Weisberg, Vichy Lau,, p. 3.
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myth that all French were part of the resistance. And he brought to bear
the very aims for legal education that he had been espousing through the
law and literature movement. In speculating on why the French legal
profession collaborated in Nazi terror, he notes habits shared by lawyers
of rhe United Stares, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, viz., "an
ingrained approach to the reading oflegal texts" (original italics] that enabled
a select group of "others" to be excluded from legal protection. "Unless
legal education changes ~ in part because it has learned from these events ···
liberal constitutional cultures must turn to the other side of the coin, and
they must constantly insist on less flexible readings of the legal system's
egalitarian stories."' 1 Weisberg thereby added a historical perspective to
the requirements for a legal education that contributes to justice.
In "Literature's Twenty-Year Crossing into the Domain of Law: Con
tinuing Trespass or Right by Adverse Possession?" Weisberg defended his
approach ro law and literature in hisroricist terms. His rebuttal of post
modernist anti-foundationalism concluded,
postmodernists have only grudgingly perceived that post-war strategies of
language have perhaps been wrongly geared as a response to the referential
and idealist "simplicity" of Hitler's rhetoric, geared in fact to avoid at all
oosrs all referential language, all clarity ofspeech, all quests for meaning and
even law. Now, with new work revealing that the Holocaust emerged at
least as much from complex, creative and even deconstmctive strategies of
oppressive speech ... law and literature has eschewed any unambiguous
alliance with an antifoundational program. ' 6
Putting his project of law and literature into a historical context, Weisberg
asserts, "The events of this tragic century have more than fulfilled the
prophetic signs emerging from Melville, Dostoevsky, and Ka.fka - that the
West was ready for a cataclysm, and that the innocent of rhe world would
suffer horribly during the death throes of the dominant culture."' 7 This
is one form of historicist thinking - looking at literature of the past for
explanations of the present and ethical principles for law's furute. "Our
goal, so far unreached," Weisberg concludes, "is justice."
Weisberg represents a major line of thought about history in rhe field of
law and literature. Significantly, though they share ethical concerns, this
strand stand~ apart theoretically from LaCapra's and Fdman's approaches
" Wei.sberg, Vichy Law, p. 4.
'~ Richard H. Weisberg, "Literature'> 1wemy-year crossing into the domain of law: co1uinlling 1re,;p1ss
or right by adverse possession?" in Michael Frct:man and Andrew Lewis (eds.). Cum:m Legal lrsues:
Uterature and Law (Oxfutd: Oxford Univcr>ity Pres,, 1999), vol. i, pp. ) )··)6.
7
'
Weisberg, "Literature's rwenry-year cro,sing," p. 60.
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to historical trauma. Weisberg may share more with Habermas, who
similarly reads the past to discern new social formations for attaining justice
in the present. Trauma studies may share methodologies with New His
toricism, but the latter neither confines itself to examples of historical
trauma nor brings the same ethical commitments to its subject matter.
New Historicists may take up law and literature topics with skepticism

about power and the disciplining effects of discourses, but often their work
makes no presentist claims about history. Increasingly, they draw upon
the materials of traditional empiricist historical scholarship of law and
literature. Al:, I suggested at the outset, then, a host of ethical and methodo
logical commitments have arisen since the founding of the law and litera
ture movement that have brought historians, legal scholars, literary critics,
and others into conversation to practice multidisciplinary methods of
interpretation. Significantly, multidisciplinary scholarship, such as that
of Shapiro, Welsh, and Pateman, contributes a more robust defense of
Weisberg' s aims for law and literature.

A History of Truth across the Disciplines: Barbara Shapiro's
"Beyond Reasonable Douht" and "Probabk Cause'~· Historical
Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law ofEvidence
Barbara Shapiro's multidisciplinary explorations of the history of truth
in the early modern period represent a key development for historical
approaches to literature and law. In Probability and Certainty in
Seventeenth-Century England: A Study ofthe Relationships between Natural
Science, Religion, History, law, and literature (1983) she demonstrated
that law did not constitute an autonomous institution and body of
doctrine, but functioned dynamically within a network of discourses in
evolving ideas of truth and belief. How legal doctrine and criminal
procedure could reveal the workings of that dynamic was the subject of

"Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause':, Historical Perspectives
on the Anglo-American Law ofEvidence (1991}.
Nothing is more fundamental to legal decision-making than the inter
connection betWeen epistemology and justice, or, more baldly, the true and
the good Investigating this relationship as discursively constructed and
historically contingent required a reconceptualization of legal decision
making and methodological innovation. To demonstrate how law interacted
with - and shaped - the transfonnation of dominant ideas of what was
probaMy true, Shapiro translated across disciplines, examining texts from
law, religion, and philosophy from 1500 to 1800. That is, she proceeded
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synchronically and diachroniw.lly. Though Shapiro covers an extensive
span of time - actually reaching back to the Middle Ages and suggesting
implications for contemporary law- she resists applying a master narrative.
She reads with attention to differences among discourses at particular
points in history as well as how they change across time.
Moreover, Shapiro draws attention to the problems posed by legal
history. "Law is a particularly challenging branch of intellectual history,"
she reflects, "because, at least in the common-law world, the actors being
observed have a panicular interest in disguising what the historian seeks
to discover."' 8 The proccsse.~ of legal decision-making, she notes, are
largely unrecorded. "What we can know about the history of this aspect
of the law of evidence is very limited because of the black box of the jury,
and of the magistrate, for rhat matter ... Almost no historical or even
contemporary record exists of what actually goes on in the minds of the
actors in the criminal justice system." What judges do say "typically
reduces itself to such talismanic formulas as 'beyond reasonable doubt'
and 'probable cause.""'!
lo the absence of direct evidence, then, she models how a multidisci
plinary approach reveals "the way in which religious and philosophical
notions concerning the nature of truth and the appropriate methods of
attaining it affect legal concepts of evidence and proof."'"° From dense and
often undigested guides to magistrates and jurors, among other sources,
Shapiro identifies de\·eloping pressures on conceptions of jury trials and
jurors' duties, leading to the juror becoming an evaluator of fact. This new
function demanded reliable epistemological guidelines and Shapiro argue~
that, while legal doctrine was influenced by standards of proof in other
disciplines, legal conceptions of probability and certainty exened a major
influence beyond law.

Formalism Has a History: Alexander Welsh's
Strong Representations (I99:2,)
Strong Representations: Narrative and Circumstantial Evidence in England
historicized formalist analysis in the imerdiscipline of law and literature.
Welsh had addressed Victorian law and literature in George Eliot
and Blackmail (1985) and From Copyright to Copperfield: The Identity

'' B.ubara Shapiro. "Rryond Rf4!0tiabk Dm,bt" and Tnrhab/r Cau.s(": Hiuerfral Pmpf,Tluer on thr
AngW-Amnican Law of Evidn,a (Berkeley: Uni,er.sii_y of California Press, 1991 ), p. 249.
'" Shapiro, "Beyond rcawnable doubt," p. xii.
'" Shapiro, "Beyond reasonabl~ doub,." p. ,.;;,
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of Dickens (1987). His inAuential 1990 article, "Burke and Bentham on
the Narrative Potential of Circumstantial Evidence," marked a move into
the study of probability and its representational forms. 21 Strong Represen
tations would take up where Shapiro's Beyond Reasonable Doubt left off.
Welsh focused on the period 1700-1900, but like Shapiro, he saw the
need for new, multidisciplinary investigation into the long arc of epistemo
logical and ethical transformations from the early modern period into
modernity. And, like Shapiro, Welsh considered law to be a key force in
this dynamic - not an autonomous category of discourse and practice, but
one jostling alongside not only literature but theology and science, as well.
"The history of narratives founded on circumstantial evidence is multifari
ous," Welsh wrote, "and neither lawyers nor novelists nor psychologists
wouJd have pushed the evidence so far, or forged so many chains, were ir
not for important precedents in science and natural religion."n
The principal differences betvveen Welsh and Shapiro are suggested
by his title. For Welsh, evidence and belief arise from multidisciplinary
dynamics, but they are constituted through "representations." He inves
tigates the formal narrative qualities of probative circumstantial evidence
across disciplines - how they are murually constitutive and how they
evolve over time. For the period he studies, he takes "strong representa
tions" to mean those that
[O]penly distrust direct tesrimony, insist on submining witnesses ro the test
of corroborating circumstances, and claim to know many things without
anyone's having sem them at all. They may be religious or legal or literary
representations, a. long as no devilish or miraculous interventions are
admitted. They are very much of the Enlightenment, representations that
mirror without my~tery the Pauline evidence of things not seen.'J
"To make a representation," he explains, "means to subordinate the
facts to a conclusion that makes a difference one way or the other. " 24 That
is, representations of evidence employ narrative devices of selection,
emphasis, order, point of view, etc., as a rhetorical strategy regardless of
discipline or genre. Interestingly, he locates the origins of this insight
connecting literary narrative strategies with the management of legal
evidence in Ian Watt's The Rise ofthe Novel. "Watt's implicit comparison

" Alexander Welsh. "Burke and Bentham on the narrative pmential of circumstantial evidence," Ntw
Litrrary History."' (1989-90), 607->7.
" AlelUlmler W~lsh, Sming Rrpmemari,ms: Narratiue m,J Cirromstlmtial £.,,d,'tlce in fngland
{Balcimore, Johns Hopkins Uni~ersny Press, 1992). p. 7.
" Welsh, Strong Rtpmmtatioru, p. 8.
"' Webh, Strong Rtpmmrarioru, p. <).

Law and Literature and History

between Defoe's or Richardson's realism and Fielding's," Welsh writes,
"applies equaUy well to distinctions between direct and indirect evidence,
ot between evidentiary facts and facts arranged, in Burke's terms, 'narra
tively and historically.' In a given trial, each kind of evidence may have its
virtues, as the nature of the case of personality of the witnesses will
2
determine. The same is true of the noveL" '
Welsh brings to his subject a literary historian's appreciation for the
conditions of authorship and publication, as well. The explosion of print
culture, in Welsh's argument, exerts its own influence on how evidence is
evaluated and managed. He attributes the evolution of modern "adjectival
law" to treatises on rules of evidence and published law repons, which
burgeoned in the late eighteenth century. Such authoritative tomes as
Wtgmore on Evidence should be understood in part as ways of managing
proliferating "legal" publications, such as trial accounts (including the Old
Bailey Sessions Papers), sensational pamphlets, and legal digests.
Finally, Welsh read~ a range ofliterary genres (fiction, poetry, criticism),
as well as extensive professional and popular legal, theological, and scien
tific materials. This includes a historicized example of law as literature:
a chapter on the epistemological import, historical contexts, and rhetorical
devices of James Fitzjames Stephen's introduction to EVidence (1872).
Stephen, "whose authority in English criminal law" Welsh describes as
being "as great as Fielding's in the novel," treat~ circumstantial evidence
almost exdu~ively in murder cases, thereby betraying an anxiety about
religious attitudes toward human life in the age of Lyell's geology, some
thing he shares in common with Tennyson's in Memoriam. 26 Lyell, Welsh
notes, was also a barrister. In sum, Strong Representations set a high bar for
the multidisciplinary study of the history of evidence.
Telling a Difference Story: Carole Pateman's The Sexual
ConlTact (1988)
The Sexual Contract is a leading example of how theories of difference
were historicized - a critical element in historicizing law and literature.
Difference as the principle by which inequities and subjugation are consti+
tu.red was, of course, a central concern of much law and literature scholar
ship. Feminists and critical race theorists, for example, found in law and
literature an opportunity to combat present-day legal oppression with
literary liberation - at the same time critiquing the interdiscipline fut its
'' Wd,h. Strong Representllliom, p. 6).

'" Wdsh, Strong RepmenUJtiom. pp.

I jl;

114-5.
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resistance to difference. And though it would seem to have been an
obvious point of engagement among law and literature practitioners from
various disciplines, questions of difference were - and to some degree
remain - confined within disciplinary and theoretical silos. Ahistorical
conceptions of law, literature, and difference, though not the sole causes
of these disconnects, were major contribucors. Treating difference not as
an ahistorical absolute but as a historically constructed system of social

organization in significant ways enabled - perhaps demanded - multi
disciplinary approaches. Significantly, one such breakthrough argument
came from a political theorist. Carole Pateman approached law not as an
autonomous institution or a cranshistorical metaphor, but as one entity
in a network of evolving social practices wirh unjust, ongoing, and
remediable consequences.
Paceman historicized difference as a mechanism of political subordin
ation with a sweeping, detailed, and vigorously argued history of social
contract theory, demonstrating how it necessarily entailed sexual inequality.
Drawing on feminist historians such as Gerda Lerner, Paceman demon~
strated that patriarchy was neither a relic from long-gone kinship structures
nor an abstraction of postmodern feminist theory; rather, it was an identi
fiable aspect of the writings of Locke, Rousseau, and other social contract
theorists. From its origins in the seventeenth century, social contract theory
depended upon an unacknowledged sexual contract - the marriage
contract - with the result that women's inferior legal status became a
constitutive feature of liberal democracy.
By demonstrating that gender subordination was inherent in the
transition from status to contract, Paceman made a radical challenge to
received histories of modern political structures since Maine's inffuentiaJ
Ancient Law. Moreover, she argued that our failure to recognize how
social contract theory historically obscured its dependence on the sexual
conrract prevented us from understanding how women were necessarily
disadvantaged in conremporary liberal democracy. If"patriarchy" was no
longer a historical dinosaur, relegated to the era of kinship politics, but
was instead a vital part of an ongoing historical legacy, then its function
in conremporary social and political relationships demanded attention.
Paceman extends her own argument to the social and legal status of
contemporary sex workers and surrogate morhers.
Pateman's argument may have gone to the heart oflega! history, but
it met resistance. Nor did law and literature respond immediately to
feminist challenges. But in time, the history of difference - gender, race,
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sexuality - became a major focus of law and literature. Two years after
The Sexual Contract wa.~ published, literary critic Carolyn Heilbrun and
law professor Judith Resnik drew attention to the persistent resistance to
feminism in the law and literature movement. '- 7 They argued that law
and literature remained "indifferent to the rich infusion of feminist
theory in literature departments and to the claims that feminist jurispru
dence was making in law." 28 Their work sparked defensive responses,
but also encouraged feminist scholars to address the history of women
through literature and law. They were joined by critical race theorists
similarly objecting to claims that law could be equitably administered if it
failed to address racial difference. Many theories contributed to the press
for a recognition of difference in law, and they often came from literary
theory and appealed to literary texts as a corrective to the historical
legacies of legal oppression. 29
Pateman, Shapiro, Welsh, and Weisberg help us to recognize how lines
of inquiry and methods of analysis integrated historical thinking into law
and literature. For us, such key concepts as evidence, testimony, agency,
and equity all have histories constructed across multiple disciplines. 'What
requires our attention now is how our practices have fostered new legal and
political proce.~se.~ that institutionalize historical narration as a response to
atrocity and as a means to transition to just, democratic political structures
from oppressive, violent, even genocidal, regimes. It may be hard to see
what impact historicizing law and literature might have beyond the acad
emy. But the theoretical underpinnings of our multidiscipline are largely
those to which advocates of truth and reconciliation processes appeal. That
law, literature, and history would become intertwined in transitional
justice processes during the same period in which the interdiscipline of
law and literature was coming to embrace historical approaches is no mere
coincidence. If we engage in historical approaches to law and literature,
then we should be aware of how the theories we employ are shaping justice
in the present and future .

., Carnlyr1 Hedhrun and Judith Resnik, "Convergences: law, lncr.itllre and fr:min11m," Yak I.aw
journal, 9'! (1990), 1913.
' 9 }lldith Rc,n;k, ·'Singular and aggregate voCces: audience, and authority in [a,,, & litcramrc and Sn
law & fr,n',iism" 'n \1id,ad Free,nan and Andrew I ,ewis (cd,.), Cummt Legal Jssu,,: I.;ie,arure and
Law (Oxford. Oxford Uni,·er1uy Pre.ss. r999). vol. ,, p. 688.
' 9 Sec, for example. Susan Sage Heiruel:nan and Zipporah Wiseman (eds.). RepmeminJ; Women: Law,
Uteratim: and frminism (Durham: Duke Cr1ivcnity Press, 1994).
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Witnessing History/Achieving Justice

Law and literature's engagement with history - and a web of other
disciplines - has had profound practical consequences for how we have
come to respond to atrocities since the Holocaust. As we have seen, the
Holocaust radically challenged assumptions about justice, representation,
aesthetics, and history. The urgent demands for justice and reconciliation
posed by new acts of mass violence tax our abilicy to mount meaningful
responses. Martha Minow has described contemporary responses to atro
cities as:
lurch[ingJ among the rhetorics of law (puriishment, compensation, deter
rence): history (truth); cheoiogy (forgiveness); therapy (healing); art
(commemoration and disturbance); and education (learning lessons). None
is adequate and yet, by invoking any of these rhetorio, people wager that
social responses can alter the emotional experiences of individuals and
societies living after mass violence. 30

Minow makes these remarks as editor of Breaking the Cycles of Hatred:
Memory, Law and Repair, a collection of essays bringing together scholars
from many fields with the hope that their shared insights might yield new
pracrices that disrupt the narrative of violence, rrauma, and revenge.
M inow herself exemplifies this phenomenon. A leading legal theorist, she
has been involved in many human rights projects, including the Independ
ent International Commission on Kosovo and the UN High Commission
on Refugees. Significantly, her thinking on post-atrocity justice and
healing has been shaped by literary and philosophical theories of hisrory.
Responding to her own question - "After mass atrocity, what can and
should be faced about the pase" - she cites conflicting answers from Je-.m
Baudrillard, Milan Kundera, the philosopher Hermann Lubbe, and the
journalist Tina Rosenberg, among others. How histories of violence are
narrated conditions the likelihood of justice and peace in the future.
"Living after genocide, ma~s atrocity, totalitarian terror," Minow writes,
"makes remembering and forgetting not just about dealing with the past.
The treatment of the past through remembering and forgetting crucially
shape1. the present and the future of individuals and entire socicties." 3 '

0
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In other words, these traumatic events necessarily conjoin law, lirerature,
and hisrory with real urgency.
Julie Stone Peters, a skeptic oflaw and literature, cites the interdiscipline
as one key source of the testimonial practices that have been institutional
i1ed in transitional justice movements. "What lies behind claims about the
value of post-atrocity narrative," she argue,,
arc a set of views influenced by ancient Christian traditions of conf-<:ssion
and redemption and by modern psychoanalysi~, but horrowed al.so from
literary and narrative theory of the pa,t quarter century. These views were
promulgated most directly by what became known in the r98os as the "law
and literature movement," with its r99os offshoot, the "legal storytelling
movement" ... These movements entered into dialogue with less narrowly
legal and more global .\\lb-disciplines and theoretical movemems: Holocaust
studie.1, with its discus~ion of the nature and limiL~ of the represemation of
atrocity and the paradoxes of memorial; feminist cridcism and critical race
theory, with their discussion of the libcratory force of counter-hegemonic
narrative; Latin American "restimonio" and uauma studies, with their
discussion of witness bearing and the curative power of truth. 32
But even for this critic of law and literature in the domain of post
atrocity politics, more history - not less - is the answer. Having proffered
this genealogy of "truth commissions and other testimonial venues,"
Peters urges us to "look at the intertwined hi~tories of modern literature
and modern rights, histories that are ... inextricably linked from the
eighteenth century onward. Understanding these linked histories may
help us not only to contextualize contemporary claims about the func
tion of narrative in the representation of human rights abuses, but also to
look cridcally at some of their strongest assumptions." 33
South Africa'~ Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is the best
known example of how this process has led to what Claire Moon has
termed the "reconciliation industry." 14 Mark Sanders's analysis of the
report of South Africa's TRC succinctly illustrates how law, personal
narratives, and hi~tory are linked. Whereas the Commission solicited,
attended to, and recorded testimony from both victims and perpetrators
of apartheid, in ih five-volume written report "extracts from testimony arc

'' Julie Swne Peter.,, "l.Hera1ure,' the ''eights of man,"' and narrallves of atrocity: hisror:cal
background, to the culture of rc,tCmon~·.'· Yale Journal of I.au, and rhe Humanitir.,, 17(2) (2003),
l\\-6.
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illustrative, first~person attestations to the veracity of the historical narra
tive, written in the third person, that encloses them." Sanders reminds us
that the report explicitly states that its purpose is not "to wrire the history
of th[e] country." Nevertheless, he argues that "the cumulative effect is of
a thorough historical reckoning, albeit one driven by an exposure and
cataloguing of human rights violations so relentless that it leaves little space
for anything other than a history of gross human right<. violations." 31
The TRC brings home to m the real-life impact ofour scholarly theories
and practices. This is made particularly vivid in the writing of Pumla
Godobo--Madikizela. A theorist of transitional justice movements, she
brings a complex rnuhidisciplinary perspective to rhe matrix of identities
she inhabits as a black South African woman, a professor of psychology,
and a member of rhe TRC. In A Human Being Died that Night: A South
African Story ofForgiveness {2003), Godobo-Madik.izela reAects on her own
subject positions and their competing responses to history. As a member of
the TRC, she writes,
My emotiom were becoming increasingly confused, but only in the sense
that they represented my multiple identities, the past, and the present: as a
d1ild, student and adulc growing up under the apartheid regime; as a human
being ab[e to feel compassion for the suffering of ochers; a.~ a member of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commis.sion expected to remain levelheaded in my
thinking abom the past. 36

Both national and personal healing demand a robust theory of forgiveness,
Godobo-Madikizela argues - a narrative that negotiates the ferociously
difficult demands of historical trauma and future peace.
First, Godobo-Mad.ikizela acknowledges that the TRC was "essentially a
political project, the creation of a political compromise that played out in
the public domain." There are limits to whar the legal, political, and
narrative structures of the TRC could contribute to transitional justice,
bypassing the real social and psychological work of processing historical
rrauma. Godobo-Madikizela presents two options for dealing with histor
ical trauma, both taken &om Holocaust theorists - respectively, Hannah
Arendt and Emanuel Levinas. She rejects Arendt's argument that the
Holocaust transcends human ethics and politics and therefore lies outside

'' Mark Sanders. Ambiguities of Wimming; Law and Lit.mtture in the Timt: ofa Truth CommfrsWn
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the domains of forgiveness or justice, remarking that "One of the
problems with these views, which have come to represent conventional
wisdom on the subject of forgiveness in some circles, is that they are no
longer realistic in light of actual practice in post-conflict situations."l 7
Instead, Godobo-Madikizela seeks to break the cycle of violence and
turns to Levinas, as well as Julia Krisreva and Jacques Derrida, to theorize
"restorative justice" and reconciliation. She poses the question: "is Levi
nas's ethics compatible with the political realm?" 18 Her answer begins
with literature, specifically Julia Kristeva's analysis of Crime and Punish
ment, in which Kristeva counters "Arendt's conceptualization of the
term [forgiveness], [and] contends that forgiveness is a means to initiate
a new beginning."'9 Next she turns to Derrida's reflection.~ on history
and forgiveness. Derrida, she writes, "expands the boundaries of the
forgivable beyond Hannah Arendt's ethical limits, revealing its complex
ity. Placing it in an historical context he resists giving the absolute 'final
word' on what can or cannot be forgiven. "40
What does this tell us about the state of law, literature, and history
as a multidiscipline? First, it tells us that these three disciplines - and
their practitioners - have been inextricably connected in current events.
What was once a matter of overcoming academic silos, or methodological
disputes, is now a practical reality with wide impact. Julie Stone Peters
once opined that literary scholars were drawn to legal topics to compen
sate for their irrelevance in human affairs. As her own more recent work
indicates, history has thrust literature into politics with a vengeance.
Second, our practice takes place in a context that is not only more
interdisciplinary, but also international. My focus here has been on the
English common law tradition, which partly encompasses South Africa.
Bur our multidisciplim: will increasingly be compelled to be comparative
and rake into account distinctive rradirions of law, literature, and history.
Finally, that our most urgent agenda should be to historicize law and
literature more fully, whatever our area of research. fu I have argued
elsewhere, such scholarship "demonstrates the historically contingent
political impact of legal and literary texts for outsider advocacy."
Historical approaches to law and literarure, regardless of the particular
subject matter, caution against claims that any discourse possesses reli
ably salutary qualities. What is demonstrated by the scholarship I have
di~cussed here is that we live with the legacy of modernity, "inherited
" G"doho-\-ladiki,da, A Hum.m, p. 4;,.
"' Codobo-.\fadCku.ela, A Human, p. 5n
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conceptions of justice [that] have been imagined across a variety of
discourses, literature and law each making distinctive contributions and
offering salutary mutual critiques." 4 '
Finally, historical approaches to law and literature should nor merely
dissolve differences among disciplinary methodologies, Rather, they should
challenge us to become more deeply literate in an array of discinctive
disciplines - law, literature, history, theology, philosophy, psychology,
politics, economics, science - so that each enhances our critical under
standing of the others. As practices of teaching and scholarship, historical
approaches to law and literature contribute an informed, sympathetic
critique to projecrs that wisely engage the full range of human discourses
to advance the common good.
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